Democracy Erodes From the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe, by L. Bartels (New Jersey/ Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2023, ISBN: 9780691244525); 280 pp., £25.00 (Hardcover)/£17.99 (Paperback)/£17.50 (eBook).
本书利用欧洲社会调查数据，分析2002-2019年欧洲公民对民主的态度，发现公众舆论稳定甚至更积极，民主倒退主要由精英推动而非公民态度转变。
‘Democracy Erodes from the Top’ is a provocative title that promises much, and – attention, spoiler alert – the book delivers on that promise. It is a fascinating read that addresses numerous crucial topics in public opinion research, provides historical context for many European countries and recent crises and serves as an excellent foundation for further research. Larry Bartels begins by acknowledging observations made by many public opinion scholars over the years: public opinion tends to remain relatively stable over time. Despite the rise and electoral success of populist right-wing parties in Europe, citizens continue to show high levels of support for democracy, trust in institutions and overall stable attitudes. This apparent paradox – stable public opinion alongside electoral outcomes suggesting a ‘crisis of democracy’ or ‘democratic backsliding’ – motivates Bartels' investigation. He examines a myriad of factors, including citizens' economic evaluations and welfare state attitudes, support for European integration (Chapters 2 and 3), attitudes towards migration (Chapter 4), overall ideological polarization, trust in institutions and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (Chapter 5). These factors form the framework for a deeper exploration of support for populist right-wing parties (Chapter 6) and the impact political elites can have on ‘dismantling democratic institutions’ (p. 15), with a focus on Hungary and Poland (Chapter 7). Bartels primarily uses data from the European Social Survey (ESS) since 2002, analysing and comparing three different periods: before the economic and financial crisis (2002–2007), the crisis period itself (2008–2013) and the period after the economic and financial crisis (2014–2019). Overall, Bartels concludes that public opinion has not only remained stable but has sometimes become even more positive, as evidenced by stable attitudes towards European integration, increased satisfaction with public services and improved attitudes towards immigration. Consequently, he argues that democratic backsliding is less driven by public opinion or a citizen shift towards more authoritarian and illiberal attitudes and more by the elites' management of institutional arrangements and political situations. He summarizes this very nicely as follows: ‘The real threat of a “populist explosion” is that political elites will harness the ubiquitous dissatisfactions of democratic politics in support of antidemocratic rule’ (p. 184). His theoretical arguments, empirical analyses and overall conclusions are thought-provoking. However, they prompt the immediate question of whether, 5 years later in 2024, the same conclusions can still be drawn or whether recent events and crises have altered his main findings. In more detail, whilst Larry Bartels makes a compelling argument supported by empirical evidence that democracy erodes from the top, his empirical analyses stop before the onset of several significant events: (a) the Covid-19 pandemic, (b) the war in Ukraine, (c) the related inflation crisis and (d) the overall focus on climate change. It would thus be both important and interesting to explore changes in citizens' attitudes and satisfaction levels during and after these various crises. For instance, in many European countries, trust in institutions has declined substantially, anti-immigration sentiments have increased across Europe, as evidenced by the European Parliament elections of 2024, and satisfaction with national health services has significantly decreased. The question that arises is whether these recently observed changes are the result of the long-term influence of elite behaviour or whether the crises have reversed the processes, leading to democracy eroding from the bottom rather than from the top. Extending the time frame of analysis would also be crucial to study citizens' support for populist right-wing parties and its association with shifts in public attitudes on migration and identity politics. New data from the ESS and other sources, including new panel studies, could shed light on these recent developments. This would allow us to evaluate the current state of the ‘crisis of democracy’ process, determining to what extent it remains primarily elite driven (top-down) and to what extent it has become citizen driven (bottom-up). Furthermore, the three time periods referenced suggest that Bartels considers elite responses to economic problems as central factors contributing to the crisis of democracy. Whilst economic issues are undoubtedly significant in citizens' lives, there may be an overemphasis on economic rationalization. Indeed, Bartels demonstrates that, in certain countries, economic problems are not the primary drivers of the attitudes analysed. Instead, cultural and political frictions are more influential. Thus, identity politics, coupled with migration issues, appear to be of critical importance, necessitating a different classification of time periods. These factors may have gained even more significance since 2019. Next, Larry Bartels examines in detail ‘The Populist Wave’. He shows that right-wing populist sentiments have been present amongst European citizens for quite some time, and it is rather anti-immigrant sentiment and dissatisfaction with democracy that significantly influence voting for right-wing populist parties, rather than populist sentiments per se. This finding is not particularly surprising and has been shown regularly in previous research, particularly with regard to the fact that economic dissatisfaction does not drive support for right-wing populist parties. However, Bartels' analysis highlights a shift in the supply side, indicating that mainstream parties are increasingly unable to ‘deliver’. Populist sentiments may however act as moderators of these relationships, an aspect warranting further investigation. Thus, whilst these findings are not entirely unexpected, Bartels' overall conclusion that dissatisfaction may foster support for antidemocratic features is worrisome and requires further exploration. Bartels also shows that the transformation of liberal democracies into illiberal democracies does not occur as a result of citizens' initial attitudes and perspectives. Rather, the establishment of illiberal democracies is orchestrated by conservative parties once they have attained power. Specifically, political elites drive these institutional changes, with citizens subsequently following their lead. The empirical evidence presented aligns well with current political discourse: to what extent are populist right-wing parties, upon entering government or becoming the dominant party, capable of ‘modifying’ democratic institutions and dismantling checks and balances? Analysing Poland and Hungary in detail, Bartels demonstrates that democratic backsliding can occur with relative ease, with citizens acting as ‘passive bystanders to the erosion of democracy’ (p. 15). Overall, based on the empirical findings from Poland, and particularly Hungary, and drawing on Bartels' conclusions, I would however argue that democracy is in profound crisis. If citizens assess democratic procedures solely based on their economic and social well-being, we face a severe democratic crisis. In other words, if economic well-being turns a blind eye towards undemocratic procedures and alterations in the democratic architecture of political systems, it suggests a crisis of democratic citizenship and not only a crisis of political leadership. Eventually, Larry Bartels frequently utilizes aggregate statistics to support his general assertions. Whilst this approach provides an excellent overview of trends and changes, it sometimes hides differences at the group and individual levels, as well as at the country level, as evidenced by public support for European integration. Although Bartels indicates that over 80% of Europeans support their country remaining a member of the European Union, other surveys reveal (a) significant country-level differences, (b) changes in support over time and (c) a considerable proportion of people without a definitive opinion on EU membership. Therefore, the question of whether the EU continues to receive strong support and thereby maintains high legitimacy (p. 51) requires continuous examination to avoid overlooking potential tipping points in public opinion. Overall, a more thorough engagement with the data would have been beneficial, such as detailing how indicators were created and presenting the statistical models in greater detail. Additionally, robustness checks would have strengthened the results, and a clearer definition of populist right-wing parties would have been valuable. Examining polarization is crucial when addressing the crisis of democracy. Bartels demonstrates that ideological polarization is scarcely observable over time in the countries studied; however, it may be affective polarization that plays a significant role, which has not been explored, likely due to a lack of data. Furthermore, some causal claims are difficult to substantiate with the available data. Nonetheless, this underscores that the author has provided scholars of public opinion with substantial material for further contemplation, including additional statistical models to further investigate these relationships. To sum up, the book by Bartels offers a novel perspective on discussions of democratic backsliding. He presents a comprehensive historical overview of significant democratic processes that future research should continue to build on. Whilst Bartels has nicely argued in his book that ‘perceptions of “crisis” is greatly overblown’, he also demonstrates that elites can significantly contribute to democratic crises. Frustrations with the working of democracy may be triggered by economic conditions, however these frustrations can have detrimental long-term effects on democratic political support. This aligns with Lipset's theoretical argument from several decades ago: the interplay between economic efficiency and the political legitimacy of democratic systems is essential for their stability.