Asset-Side Bank Runs and Liquidity Rationing: A Vicious Cycle
研究了银行与信贷额度借款人之间的战略互补性如何导致挤兑与流动性配给的恶性循环，并量化了该效应在2008-2009年危机中占信贷收缩的三分之二。
I analyze runs on credit lines in an infinite-horizon banking model, focusing on the strategic complementarity between bankers and credit line borrowers. Panic drawdowns by borrowers coupled with bank liquidity rationing can mutually reinforce each other, creating a vicious cycle. Using data from U.S. banks, I estimate the model and quantify the amplification effect arising from strategic complementarity. This amplification effect accounted for two-thirds of the contraction of bank credit during the 2008–2009 crisis. Moreover, I show that policies targeting borrowers have a crowding-in effect and can effectively contain credit contraction. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00872 .