Optimal Resilience in Multitier Supply Chains
研究多层供应链中企业前瞻性投资对韧性的影响，比较均衡与最优配置，并推导出实现最优的补贴政策。
Abstract Forward-looking investments determine the resilience of firms’ supply chains. Such investments confer externalities on other firms in the production network. We compare the equilibrium and optimal allocations in a general equilibrium model with an arbitrary number of vertical production tiers. Our model features endogenous investments in protective capabilities, endogenous formation of supply links, and sequential bargaining over quantities and payments between firms in successive tiers. We derive policies that implement the first-best allocation, allowing for subsidies to input purchases, network formation, and investments in protective capabilities. The first-best policies depend only on production function parameters of the pertinent tier. When subsidies to transactions are infeasible, the second-best subsidies for resilience depend on production function parameters throughout the network, and subsidies are larger upstream than downstream whenever the bargaining weights of buyers are nonincreasing along the chain.