The European Union as a Target: When Do Democratic Backsliders Rhetorically Challenge the EU?
研究民主倒退的领导人（如匈牙利的欧尔班和波兰的杜达）如何根据公众对欧盟的看法以及欧盟制裁的可能性，调整其对欧盟的言辞攻击策略。
Abstract Populist actors who conduct democratic backsliding incrementally eat away at institutional checks on power. Whilst they largely focus on domestic institutions, European Union (EU) member states have an international democratic institution to consider as well. In this article, we present and test a theory explaining changes in backslider rhetoric towards the EU. Whilst they often claim a position of Euroscepticism, their interactions with the EU are complicated. We argue that anti‐democratic actors consider the public perception of the EU and the likelihood of enforcement and sanctions from the EU when deciding what type of rhetoric to use. Using speeches from Orbán in Hungary and Duda in Poland, we find that the effect of public opinion on speech sentiment varies between leaders. We also find evidence of position blurring in response to increases in EU threat levels.