Healthcare Appointments as Commitment Devices
实验表明，普通预约能替代硬性承诺工具，使马拉维高风险男性的HIV检测率翻倍以上，尤其对有自我控制问题的人有效，且避免了承诺失败的风险。
Abstract We show that ordinary appointments can act as effective substitutes for hard commitment devices and increase demand for a critical healthcare service, particularly among those with self-control problems. We show this using an experiment that randomly offered HIV testing appointments and hard commitment devices to high-risk men in Malawi. Appointments more than double testing rates, with effects concentrated among those who demand commitment. In contrast, most men who take up hard commitments lose their investments. Appointments overcome commitment problems without the potential drawback of commitment failure, and have the potential to increase demand for healthcare in the developing world.