The timing of stock repurchases: Do well-connected CEOs help or harm?
研究发现人脉广泛的CEO在股票回购时支付更高价格，损害股东利益，但机构投资者和独立董事的监督能缓解这一问题。
Using a sample of daily repurchase transactions, we find that CEOs with extensive professional networks execute buybacks at higher prices relative to their less–connected peers. This finding survives a large battery of robustness tests and is unlikely to be the product of endogeneity biases. Monitoring by institutional investors, blockholders, and independent directors, as well as low levels of board busyness mitigate the detrimental effect of a well–connected CEO on repurchase timing. Moreover, better–connected CEOs are more associated with insider net sales around repurchase transactions. Overall, our evidence is consistent with CEO–shareholder agency conflict explanations and CEO power mechanisms.