Technology Coopetition and Voluntary Disclosures of Innovation
研究企业在技术标准组织中的竞合关系如何影响创新自愿披露，发现加入标准组织后企业会减少研发披露、使其更笼统并延迟专利公开，支持企业策略性隐瞒创新信息的假说。
ABSTRACT We examine firms’ voluntary disclosures of innovation under technology coopetition, focusing on technology standard setting organizations (SSOs). Technology coopetition is characterized by (1) cooperation to determine technology standards, which requires information sharing to reach consensus, and (2) competition for standard implementation to obtain standard-essential patents, which create incentives for firms to deviate from the expected level of information sharing. We document a decrease in 10-K narrative R&D disclosures, more generic 10-K narrative R&D disclosures, and a longer delay of patent disclosures via the USPTO after a firm joins an SSO. Among alternative explanations, our evidence is most supportive of the hypothesis that firms strategically withhold innovation information. JEL Classifications: L15; M41; O32.