Politicians, institutional incentives, and citizen welfare: evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India
通过修改版独裁者博弈实验，研究印度农村政治家和普通人对行为激励的不同反应，发现匿名时两者都自私，但个性化互动和承诺对政治家影响更大，而可见性对非政治家影响更强。
Abstract We examine how politicians and non-politicians in rural India respond to behavioural incentives. Using a modified dictator game, we vary treatments (and incentives) across the nature of interactions, the visibility of actions, and an upfront promise. Under anonymity, politicians and non-politicians behave selfishly: both become significantly more generous when interactions are personalized. However, while non-politicians respond to greater visibility more strongly than politicians, an upfront promise induces more pronounced politician responses. Whereas promise-breaking appears to be more costly for politicians, visibility, via social image concerns, appears to matter more for non-politicians. This mix of similarity and heterogeneity in response suggests that evidence about the behaviour of real-world politicians is more important for effective policy design than acknowledged so far.