流动性陷阱中的最优货币与转移支付政策

Optimal Monetary and Transfer Policy in a Liquidity Trap

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · 2024
被引 0
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

在异质性两主体新凯恩斯模型中,分析了最优货币与财政政策(一次性转移支付)的联合设计,发现转移支付不替代前瞻指引,并通过缩短和延长两个渠道影响零利率下限的持续时间。

Abstract

Abstract Optimal monetary and fiscal policy are jointly analyzed in a heterogeneous two‐agent New Keynesian environment, where fiscal policy is modeled as lump‐sum transfers. Transfer policy does not substitute for forward guidance—as it entails consumption dispersion costs—nor affect its optimal duration. The stay at the zero lower bound is indeed influenced through two offsetting channels: a shortening channel works through an initial increase in transfers that mitigates the recession (reducing the need for forward guidance), while a lengthening channel works through a later transfer cut that curbs the expansion (making forward guidance desirable for a longer horizon).

流动性陷阱最优货币政策转移支付政策异质性主体