Governing the Responsible Investment of Slack Resources in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Performance: How Beneficial are CSR Committees?
研究了闲置资源对ESG绩效的倒U型影响，发现企业社会责任委员会无法有效优化低或高闲置资源水平下的ESG表现。
Abstract Possessing slack resources enables businesses to invest in innovative and stakeholder-focused initiatives. Therefore, we posit that higher slack resources encourage businesses to allocate these resources to improve their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. Moreover, as a central sustainability governance mechanism, we hypothesize that the corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee supports investing slack resources in ESG initiatives. Using data from Nasdaq-100 firms, we find initial support for a positive effect of slack resources for ESG. However, further analyses reveal that slack resources become detrimental to ESG after an economically relevant threshold, indicating an inverted U-shaped effect of slack resources. Additionally, despite their generally positive effect, we uncover that CSR committees cannot effectively enhance the benefits of low or moderate slack levels for ESG nor prevent the detriments of elevated slack levels for ESG. Therefore, our study significantly contributes to the ongoing discourse surrounding slack resources, ESG, and the usefulness of CSR committees. These findings hold significant implications for ethical resource allocation, urging firms and their decision-makers to reconsider the dual-edged role of slack resources in the unique ESG context and support the CSR committee in realizing its potential for promoting sustainability and ethical practices within the organization.