Social networks and reputation incentives: Does directorship prestige influence effort?
利用社会网络理论，基于网络中心性衡量董事会和董事的声誉，发现董事在更受声望的董事职位上投入更多努力（以出席率衡量），且结果在控制标准声誉代理变量和使用外生冲击后依然稳健。
Abstract Using social network theory, we measure the reputation of boards and directors based on the centrality of their respective networks. Directors commit greater effort, as measured by actual director attendance rates, to directorships they consider more prestigious. Results are robust to controlling for standard proxies of reputation as well as using alternative measures of centrality to identify prestigious directorships. We find similar results when examining exogenous shocks to relative directorship rankings; effort improves for directorships that increase in ranking following the shock. Our findings outline the importance directors place on the perceived reputational value of their directorships.