Optimal self‐insurance with genetic testing and state‐dependent utility
分析了基因检测如何改变人们减少疾病健康和经济后果的预防行为，并探讨了在保险公司允许或禁止使用检测结果时，个人如何调整预防行为，以及不同均衡对社会福利的影响。
Abstract I analyze how genetic testing modifies prevention actions that reduce the health and financial consequences of disease. Specifically, I determine whether individuals adjust their prevention behaviour according to the available genetic information when insurers are allowed to use test results for rate‐making purposes (laissez‐faire) and when they are not (information ban). I show that individuals exploit genetic information in the laissez‐faire regime. In the information ban regime, they do so when separating equilibria prevail, but not in case of a pooling equilibrium. None of these equilibria, however, leads to the maximization of the social welfare function. I, therefore, discuss for each potential scenario the instruments likely to restore optimality.