An equilibrium analysis of the Arad-Rubinstein game
研究了离散策略空间Colonel Blotto博弈的均衡集，发现无论平局规则如何，均衡集都过大，且弱占优策略剔除无效。
Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces nicely illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the tie-breaking rule is allowed to be flexible. We begin by pointing out that equilibrium constructions known from the literature extend to our class of games. However, we also note that, irrespective of the tie-breaking rule, the equilibrium set is excessively large. Specifically, any pure strategy that allocates at most twice the fair share to each battlefield is used with positive probability in some equilibrium. Furthermore, refinements based on the elimination of weakly dominated strategies prove ineffective.