The real effects of M&As on targets’ peers
研究发现，目标公司的同行在并购公告后会增加真实盈余管理行为，且这种效应在同行与目标公司相似度较低、目标公司获得高溢价等情况下更显著，最终损害同行长期绩效。
Abstract This paper studies the real effects of targets’ acquisitions on their peers through investigating the real earnings management (REM) behavior of the targets’ rivals following the mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that, on average, rivals of acquisition targets would engage in more REM after M&A announcements. We further find that within rivals of the target, the post‐announcement increase in REM is more pronounced when: (1) the rival is relatively less similar to the target; (2) the rival serves as the targets’ rival more than once within a year; (3) the target earns a higher bidding premium or positive abnormal returns; or (4) the rival has the higher institutional ownership or more analyst following. Additional analyses reveal that rivals engaging in more REM would have a higher likelihood of being acquired in subsequent years and would be sold at higher premiums. We also find that targets’ rivals boost their short‐term performance by engaging in REM activities at the cost of their long‐term performance. Our results are robust to various robustness checks. Overall, our evidence suggests that an acquisition activity could have a real effect on the target's industry, i.e., the effect on the accounting choices of the whole industry.