Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?
研究了强制投票（通过罚款提高参与率）对选民信息获取的影响，发现高罚款虽能实现完全投票率，但仅在投票成本高时增加信息获取，成本低时反而减少。
An election with full turnout is supposed to achieve an outcome that perfectly reflects the majority's preference.This result requires voters to be perfectly informed about their preferences and to vote accordingly.I show that incentivizing participation with an abstention fine does not necessarily incentivize information acquisition.While a small abstention fine always increases information acquisition compared to Voluntary Voting, a high abstention fine that achieves full turnout increases information acquisition only if voting costs are high.If voting costs are low, the opposite is true: Less individuals acquire information under Compulsory Voting with full turnout than under Voluntary Voting.