Monopsony Power in the Labor Market: From Theory to Policy
综述了三种解释买方垄断力量的理论框架，并基于理论和实证证据讨论了反垄断政策、降低工作转换障碍的政策以及最低工资政策如何应对买方垄断对工人的影响。
Labor markets are not perfectly competitive: Monopsony power enables employers to pay workers less than the marginal revenue product of labor. We review three theoretical frameworks explaining monopsony power. Oligopsony models attribute it to strategic interactions among a limited number of firms. Job differentiation models cite imperfect job substitution and heterogeneous worker preferences. Search-and-matching models point to search frictions hindering instantaneous access to all available jobs. We then develop a theory-informed discussion of the empirical evidence on antitrust policies, policies that reduce barriers to job switching, and policies countering monopsony's effects on workers. Preventing mergers and regulating noncompetition agreements can increase wages by preserving competition among employers. Minimum wages can mitigate the effect of monopsony power by increasing wages without reducing employment. The insights garnered from both theoretical models and empirical evidence offer a road map for crafting policies that can enhance competition in the labor market.