The Gender Gap in Household Bargaining Power: A Revealed-Preference Approach
研究了同一家庭中不同风险偏好的成员如何通过议价影响投资决策，发现存在显著的性别差距，且部分由个人特征和性别效应解释，在澳大利亚、德国和美国均成立。
Abstract When members of the same household have different risk preferences, whose preference matters more for investment decisions and why? We propose an intrahousehold model that aggregates individual preferences at the household level as a result of bargaining. We structurally estimate the model, analyze the determinants of bargaining power, and find a significant gender gap. Gender differences in individual characteristics, as well as gender effects, partially explain the gap. These patterns hold broadly across Australia, Germany, and the United States. We further link the distribution of bargaining power to households’ perceived gender norms in a cross-sectional analysis.