Signaling motives in lying games
研究说谎游戏中个体通过说谎来传递道德类型信号的动机，理论模型解释了部分说谎现象，并讨论了与形象关注理论的关系及应用。
This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some lies are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium prediction of the model can explain experimental data from previous studies, particularly on partial lying, where individuals lie to gain a non-payoff maximizing amount. I discuss the relationship with theoretical models of lying that conceptualize the image concern as an aversion to being suspected of lying and provide applications to narratives, learning, the disclosure of lies, and the selection into lying opportunities.