Founder‐CEO Compensation and Selection into Venture Capital‐Backed Entrepreneurship
理论表明，产品开发前的预期时间影响高收入潜力创始人是否选择风险资本支持的创业，因为产品开发后创始人CEO的现金薪酬大幅增加，降低了初创期风险。实证发现行业技术冲击改变产品开发时间，进而影响创业进入率和创始人特征。
ABSTRACT We show theoretically that a critical determinant of the attractiveness of venture capital (VC)‐backed entrepreneurship for high‐earning potential founders is the expected time to develop a startup's initial product. This is because founder‐CEOs' cash compensation increases substantially after product development, alleviating the nondiversifiable risk that founders face at startup birth. Consistent with the model's predictions of where the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely to be most constrained, we find that technological shocks differentially altering the expected time to product across industries can explain changes in both the rate of entry and characteristics of individuals selecting into VC‐backed entrepreneurship.