Corruption and insider trading
从中国上市公司财务报表中提取腐败度量，发现腐败程度高的公司内部人交易更激进，且其买卖交易的信息含量更高，表明腐败促使内部人利用私有信息交易。
We investigate firm corruption in China by extracting a measure of corruption from published financial statements and use this to demonstrate that corruption impacts the trading decisions of insiders. Specifically, we show that insiders in firms that are more corrupt trade more aggressively, and they are more willing to trade on their private information as evidenced by the increased informativeness of their trades, in respect of both purchases and sales. This link between firm corruption and trade informativeness is robust to the inclusion of a number of factors that are known to influence the informativeness of such trades, including trade characteristics, insider characteristics and the firm's information environment. We also consider the effect of the appointment of a new CEO or Chair. Overall, corruption related trade informativeness holds consistently for both purchases and sales. Finally, we show that this measure of corruption is robust to the inclusion of several alternative indicators of corporate misconduct.