Do Family Owners Hold Nonfamily CEOs More Accountable Than Family CEOs for Firm Performance? A Dynamic Perspective
研究家族所有者如何根据CEO任期阶段使用公司业绩来评估CEO，发现他们在任期中期更依赖业绩做更替决策，且仅在该阶段对非家族CEO比对家族CEO更严格。
This study investigates whether family owners consider the stages of CEO tenure in their use of firm performance to assess CEOs. Integrating insights on family owners’ long-term orientation and stages of CEO tenure, we theorize that family owners rely more on firm performance to make CEO replacement decisions during the mid-stage of CEO tenure than during the early and late stages. Moreover, we predict that they hold nonfamily CEOs more accountable for firm performance than family CEOs only during the mid-stage of CEO tenure. Using data from family-controlled firms in Taiwan, we found empirical evidence supportive of our theoretical predictions.