Bailout Stigma
研究了救助污名现象：接受救助会暴露企业资产负债表弱点、削弱其融资前景，高质量企业因此拒绝救助或退出后续融资，导致市场冻结甚至恶化；而设计合适的救助方案可缓解污名、恢复市场。
ABSTRACT We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance‐sheet weakness and reduces its funding prospects. To avoid stigma, high‐quality firms withdraw from subsequent financing after receiving bailouts or refuse bailouts altogether to send a favorable signal. The former leads to a short‐lived stimulation followed by a market freeze even worse than if there were no bailout. The latter revives the funding market, albeit with delay, to the level achievable without any stigma and implements a constrained optimal outcome. A menu of multiple bailout programs compounds bailout stigma and exacerbates the market freeze.