On the Interaction Between Cheap-Talk Advertising and Credible Product Reviews
研究了廉价谈话广告与可信第三方产品评论如何共同向消费者传递产品质量信息，发现广告在评论可预测时能提供信息，但评论信息过强会抑制广告的信息传递。
This paper investigates the interaction between cheap-talk advertising and credible third-party product reviews to inform customers about product quality. We find that cheap-talk advertising can be informative when the firm’s private information helps predict a credible product review. A more informative credible product review has two effects on cheap-talk advertising. First, a credible product review plays a disciplinary role that enables the firm to provide informative advertising. Second, it reduces the incremental value of cheap-talk advertising. We find that, in equilibrium, whether or not the advertising is consistent with a credible product review is informative about product quality. The results also imply that an overly informative product review can reduce the total information available to customers by deterring the firm from providing informative advertising.