Robust Contracts: A Revealed Preference Approach
研究委托人在只知道代理人针对少数已知合同的最优反应、而对其他行动和成本一无所知时，如何设计合同以最大化最坏情况下的利润。最优合同是已知合同与产出的混合，且方法易于用实验数据实施。
Abstract We study an agency model in which the principal knows the agent-optimal actions in response to K “known” contracts but is unaware of other actions available or their costs, and seeks a contract to maximize worst-case profits. The optimal contract is a mixture of the known contracts and output. Moreover, when K = 1, the single known contract maximizes the principal's profit guarantee, whereas with two known contracts, the optimal mixture puts positive weight on one of the known contracts. Our methodology is straightforward to implement, a point that we demonstrate using data from an experimental study of different incentive schemes.