The Unintended Consequences of Home-Buying Restriction in China
研究中国限购政策如何引发假离婚行为，发现政策使处理城市的离婚率上升0.436个千分点，解释了全国离婚率19.9%的增长，其中至少45%为假离婚，且主要发生在年长、无子女、低学历、富裕人群中。
Abstract We investigate the fake divorce activities associated with the home-buying restriction policy in China. We find that the policy increased divorce rate (marriage restoration rate) in the treated cities by 0.436 (0.195) permillage point relative to the control cities. This explains a 19.9% increase in the overall national divorce rate, of which at least 45% can be interpreted as fake divorces. Moreover, we find that the main responders to this policy are people who are older, childless, less-educated, and wealthier. Finally, we show that the fraudulent behavior has significant implications for market efficiency, intra- and inter-household wealth inequality, and other consequences.