Forward Guidance under Imperfect Information
研究了在私营部门和央行对经济总体状态都不完全了解时，前瞻指引如何通过披露央行当前信息并承诺未来基于完美信息制定政策，影响价格调整、生产效率和福利。
Abstract I study the effect of forward guidance in a flexible‐price economy in which both the private sector and the central bank are subject to imperfect information about the aggregate state of the economy. When forward guidance is provided, the central bank reveals its current imperfect information and commits to a policy rule that makes future policy conditional on perfect information that is only available in the future. The information provided by forward guidance makes individual prices more responsive to firm‐specific technology shocks, which increases production efficiency at the cost of higher cross‐sectional price variation. The net effect improves social welfare.