Capital Commitment
研究了私募基金要求投资者提前承诺资本对投资组合和福利的影响，发现投资者配置不足且愿意为调整承诺量支付高溢价，承诺风险溢价随二级市场流动性增加而上升。
ABSTRACT Twelve trillion dollars are allocated to private market funds that require outside investors to commit to transferring capital on demand. We show within a novel dynamic portfolio allocation model that ex‐ante commitment has large effects on investors' portfolios and welfare, and we quantify those effects. Investors are underallocated to private market funds and are willing to pay a larger premium to adjust the quantity committed than to eliminate other frictions, like timing uncertainty and limited tradability. Perhaps counterintuitively, commitment risk premiums increase with secondary market liquidity, and they do not disappear when investments are spread over many funds.