Lying to Speak the Truth: Selective Manipulation and Improved Information Transmission
研究了一个委托人-代理人模型，其中厌恶努力的代理人可以操纵公开可观察的绩效报告。最优契约通过激励代理人根据其努力选择选择性操纵，使报告更能反映努力水平，从而减少代理人的信息租金。
ABSTRACT We analyze a principal‐agent model in which an effort‐averse agent can manipulate a publicly observable performance report. The principal cannot observe the agent's cost of effort, her effort choice, and whether she manipulated the report. An optimal contract links compensation to the realized output and the (possibly manipulated) report. Manipulation can be beneficial to the principal because it can make the report more informative about the agent's effort choice, thereby reducing the agent's information rent. This is achieved through a contract that incentivizes the agent to selectively engage in manipulation based on her effort choice.