In-Kind Transfers as Insurance
研究发现，实物转移支付能对冲价格风险，对低收入印度家庭具有保险价值，并降低了卡路里摄入对价格的敏感度，为社会保障形式的选择提供了依据。
Households in developing countries often face variation in the prices of consumption goods. We develop a model demonstrating that in-kind transfers will provide insurance benefits against price risk if the covariance between the marginal utility of income and price is positive. Using calorie shortfalls as a proxy for marginal utility, we find that this condition holds for low-income Indian households. Expansions in India’s flagship in-kind food transfer program not only increase caloric intake but also reduce caloric sensitivity to prices. Our results contribute to ongoing debates about the optimal form of social protection programs.