Optimal banking with delegated monitoring
构建了一个基于委托监督的金融中介模型，其中企业收益是私人信息，贷款人需通过成本高昂的状态验证来获取。研究发现，简单债务合约在有无中介时均为帕累托最优，但中介的好处可能因总冲击导致的金融不稳定而受限，而设计良好的处置机制和救助政策可恢复稳定。
We propose a model of financial intermediation based on delegated monitoring, where firms' returns are private information that lenders can ascertain through costly state verification. Our model has two key features: lenders cannot commit to their verification strategies and there are aggregate shocks. Simple debt contracts are Pareto optimal with or without intermediation. We show that the benefits of intermediation can be limited by financial instability in the presence of aggregate shocks. However, a well-designed resolution mechanism ensures the Pareto optimality of financial intermediation, and a bail-out policy can restore financial stability.