Proxy Advisory Firms and Corporate Shareholder Engagement
利用薪酬话语权投票结果附近的准自然实验，研究机构股东服务公司（ISS）如何促使企业增加与股东的互动，尤其当董事会代理冲突较高时效果更显著，且股东对此持积极态度。
Abstract We study how Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) affect firms’ engagement with shareholders. Our analyses exploit a quasi-natural experiment using say-on-pay voting outcomes near a threshold that triggers ISS to review engagement activities. Firms receiving ISS treatment exhibit swift and substantive increases in extensive and intensive margins of engagement, especially when their boards have higher agency conflicts and directors are more likely to lose voting support from ISS. Increases in engagement persist over time, and shareholders appear to value the increased engagement. Collectively, we shed light on an unexplored channel through which ISS positively influences firms’ governance and information environments.