Insurance coverage and environmental risk in an evolutionary oligopoly
研究了存在棕色和绿色两类企业的寡头市场，通过两阶段博弈和演化博弈分析保险如何支持环境友好转型，并识别影响生态转型的关键参数。
Abstract This paper studies the evolution of an oligopoly market where two types of companies, brown and green, are present. Green firms adopt a less polluting technology that allows a reduction in emissions. We want to investigate the possibility of an environmental-friendly transition where insurance can give its support to cover the (endogenous) climate change loss. The model is composed of two parts. We analyze a two-stages game in which the companies maximize their profits by choosing output in the first stage and insurance coverage in the second one. Then we develop an evolutionary game to endogenize the selection of being brown or green, according to the expected random profits. We derive analytically the dynamic regimes may arise and we perform a sensitivity analysis at the stable inner steady state, where firms coexist, changing the main key parameters to understand which ones may be strategic for an ecological transition.