Conflicting versus reinforcing private information, information aggregation, and the time series properties of asset prices
通过实验室资产市场实验，研究了独立私人信息信号之间的关系（强化或冲突）如何影响信息聚合，发现冲突信息会降低信息效率，而强化信息则实现部分聚合，结果随经验增强。
We study how the relationship between independent private information signals affects information aggregation in laboratory asset markets. We employ two mechanisms, a continuous double auction and a prediction market. Under both mechanisms, when information is reinforcing, partial information aggregation occurs. When information is in conflict, information aggregation lessens and attempts to profit from private information frequently harm informational efficiency . In both mechanisms, results become stronger with experience in previous experimental sessions, and provide a private information benchmark for studies of the implications of conflicting public information. Under reasonable assumptions, our results are consistent with both momentum effects and weak reversals.