Do politically connected subsidy recipients disclose less subsidy information?
研究中国非国有企业发现，有政治关联的企业在年报中自愿披露补贴信息（来源和政策依据）更少，尤其在补贴难合理化、所在省份更腐败或媒体关注度更高时更明显；披露更多补贴信息的企业未来获得的补贴更少。
Abstract This paper examines the association between firms’ political connections and their voluntary disclosure of information related to government subsidies, using a sample of Chinese non‐state‐owned enterprises. We find that politically connected subsidy recipients disclose less information about their subsidies (source and policy basis) in their annual reports than do unconnected firms. This association is mainly driven by connected firms whose subsidies are difficult to justify and are stronger for firms registered in more corrupt provinces and firms with higher media attention. In addition, connected firms disclosing more subsidy information receive fewer future subsidies than do other connected firms. These findings suggest that politically connected subsidy recipients tend to withhold subsidy information to reduce the costs that accompany public scrutiny of subsidies granted through relationships.