Influencing search
研究了搜索市场中，影响者推荐产品给粉丝如何提高消费者剩余和总福利，即使企业为推荐付费。消费者搜索后才知道产品价值，低价值时不购买，搜索威胁促使企业提供佣金合同，影响者诚实推荐。
Abstract We show that in search markets an influencer who recommends a product to her followers improves consumer surplus and total welfare despite the firm paying for her recommendation. As consumers learn their value for the product upon search, they will not buy at the recommended firm if they learn their value is low. The threat of search incentivizes firms to offer the influencer a financial contract involving a commission and incentivizes the influencer to be honest in her recommendation. Provided the influencer's search cost is not too high, she also has an incentive to acquire information and give informative recommendations. These informative equilibria are more difficult to sustain if influencers compete with each other.