The Technical Default Spread
研究了贷款人控制权因技术违约转移对企业投资、资产价格和宏观经济的影响，发现技术违约临近时股票回报降低4.12%，系统性风险暴露减少。
Abstract We study the quantitative impact of lender control rights on corporate investment, asset prices, and the aggregate economy. We build a general equilibrium model in which the breaching of a loan covenant (technical default) entails a switch in investment control rights from borrowers to lenders. Lenders optimally choose low-risk projects, thus mitigating borrowers’ risk-taking incentives and lowering the cost of equity. This mechanism generates strong macroeconomic effects and mitigates the financial accelerator. Consistent with our model, proximity to technical default in the data is associated with 4.12% lower returns and lower exposure to systematic risk.