How Auditors’ Client Service Affects Managers’ Cooperation with Auditor Evidence Requests
通过两个实验，研究发现审计师在日常互动中提供更好的客户服务（如减少干扰、有效沟通）能促使客户管理者更及时、更主动地提供审计证据，包括与自身会计立场相悖的证据。
SUMMARY Audit quality is threatened when client managers are uncooperative (i.e., slow to provide evidence or not forthcoming with evidence). We examine whether auditors can increase client manager cooperation by providing better client service in their day-to-day interactions with client managers. For example, auditors can provide better client service by minimizing disruptions and communicating effectively. Across two experiments, we find that managers experiencing better client service respond timelier to auditor requests and are more forthcoming with evidence, including evidence that contradicts their preferred accounting position. Our findings suggest that auditors can use client service strategically to increase access to information, but anecdotal interviews with experienced auditors suggest that these strategic benefits are not at the forefront of auditors’ minds. Together, our study informs practice by illuminating strategic benefits of better client service and complements prior research which focuses on how service-related constructs can benefit auditors commercially and when negotiating with clients.