股东会议上的董事与股东互动:以牺牲问责制服务于殖民主义

Director and shareholder interactions at shareholder meetings: Compromising accountability in the service of colonialism

Critical Perspectives on Accounting · 2024
被引 10
ABS 3

中文导读

研究分析了塞西尔·罗兹的英国南非公司1895-1925年股东会议记录,发现董事通过操纵支持股东压制异议声音,损害了问责制,对理解现代股东会议有启示。

Abstract

This research explores director and shareholder two-way face-to-face interactions at the shareholder meetings of Cecil Rhodes’s British South Africa Company, as reflected in verbatim minutes of those meetings. Shareholder meetings are traditionally viewed as being for accountability. Alternatively, directors may engage in manipulative game-playing through skillful political maneuvering of shareholders, thereby compromising accountability. The research analyzes unique data, comprising 25 full sets of verbatim meeting minutes of 29 shareholder meetings over the period 1895–1925, using manual close-reading interpretive content analysis. Our unit of analysis is the interactions between directors and supportive/approving and dissenting shareholders. Our research question is how did the directors and shareholders interact at the shareholder meetings. We develop a typology of 16 types of interactions the directors and shareholders used in their exchanges. We complement our analysis with illustrations of types of interactions extracted from our verbatim minutes. We demonstrate how powerful directors mobilized supportive/approving shareholders to quash the dissenting shareholders’ voices. Our findings have implications for how modern-day shareholder meetings are conducted.

公司治理会计政治学商业史股东问责