Top management team incentive dispersion and management earnings forecasts
研究了高管团队成员之间薪酬绩效敏感性的差异如何影响公司发布管理层盈利预测，发现差异越大，公司越不倾向发布预测，且预测更不乐观。
Abstract We investigate whether heterogeneity in pay‐performance sensitivity (PPS) among top management team (TMT) members affects management earnings forecasts (MEFs). Extant studies find that dispersion of PPS among TMT members results in a lack of coordination among TMT members and has a significant consequence for the firm. Since the issuance of forecasts is jointly determined by TMT managers, we argue that heterogeneity in PPS among TMT members will affect forecast issuance. We find that firms are less likely to issue MEFs when PPS dispersion among TMT members is high. Moreover, the forecasts of these firms are less optimistic. Finally, our analyses reveal that the effect of dispersion of PPS among TMT members on MEFs is more pronounced when the difference in PPS between the chief executive officer and other executives is high or team tenure is short. Overall, our results suggest that heterogeneity in PPS among TMT members affects a firm's voluntary disclosures.