Influence strategies in dual distribution channels: Examining their effects on distributor opportunism
研究了双重分销渠道（相对于独立渠道）如何调节强制性和非强制性影响策略对分销商机会主义行为的作用，并发现分销商依赖度会增强这种调节效应。
Distributors' opportunistic behaviors damage the manufacturer–distributor relationships and harm the manufacturer's performance. Thus, manufacturers must curb distributors' opportunism. Influence strategies, categorized as coercive and non-coercive, affect channel members' opportunism. Although previous studies identify the boundary conditions of coercive and non-coercive influence strategies, they focus on channel relationship characteristics as boundary conditions, ignoring channel structure, such as dual distribution channels. Accordingly, we examine whether dual channel system (vs. independent channel system) moderates the relationship between coercive/non-coercive influence strategies and distributor opportunism. Moreover, we investigate whether distributor dependence enhances the dual-channel moderating role. To test our hypotheses, primary data were collected from Japanese CEOs engaged in distribution firms. The results indicate that the dual channel system enhances the facilitating effect of coercive influence strategy on opportunism, whereas the suppressive effect of non-coercive influence strategy on opportunism works only in a dual-channel and high distributor dependence situation. This study contributes to a better understanding of marketing channels and provides novel insights for business managers. • Coercive and non-coercive influence strategies affect distributor opportunism. • These effects depend on the manufacturer's channel structure. • Dual distribution enhances coercive influence strategies affecting opportunism. • Non-coercive influence strategies can suppress opportunism only in a dual-channel and distributor dependence situation.