On market clearing of day ahead auctions for European power markets: Consumer payment minimisation versus social welfare maximisation
研究提出消费者支付最小化（CPM）机制，与欧洲日前电力市场标准的社会福利最大化（SWM）对比，发现CPM能降低生产者市场势力、区域电价和总购电成本。
For inflexible demand and considering network constraints, we introduce a Consumer Payment Minimisation (CPM) market clearing mechanism and compare it with the standard Social Welfare Maximisation (SWM) used in European Day Ahead Electricity Markets. CPM presents a challenging optimisation problem, which we addressed by four numerical algorithms with varying computational costs and convergence guarantees, evaluated on synthetic data. We derive strong, partial analytical results and the concept of optimal zonal stack curves to facilitate efficient CPM solutions. Evaluations using 2019–2020 data from the Central Western European Day Ahead Power Market under the assumption of truthful bidding show that SWM models historical prices well, while CPM reduces producers’ market power and decreases zonal prices and total electricity procurement costs compared to SWM.