SELF‐EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR MARKET RISKS
研究发现自雇者收入波动大于雇员且常失业，通过校准搜索模型分析针对这些风险的福利政策，发现将美国失业保险扩展至自雇者会增加其失业率并导致不同技能群体福利不均。
Abstract I study the labor market risks associated with self‐employment. I document that the self‐employed are subject to larger earnings fluctuations than employees and frequently transition into unemployment. I analyze the provision of benefits targeted at these risks using a calibrated search model with (i) precautionary savings, (ii) work opportunities in paid‐ and self‐employment, and (iii) skill heterogeneity. Extending the U.S. unemployment insurance scheme to the self‐employed increases the transition rate from self‐employment to unemployment and yields an unequal benefits to contributions ratio across skill groups. At the calibrated parameters, the self‐employed in the middle of the skill distribution lose welfare.