Hedging mortality risk over the life‐cycle—The role of information and borrowing constraints
研究了年金池化死亡率风险的累退性偏见，发现风险厌恶家庭年轻时购买池化合同是最优的，借贷约束会削弱这种提前购买，但强制池化年金可改善所有风险类别的福利。
Abstract Many pension schemes offer annuities pooling mortality risk across members. Such pooling has been criticized for having a regressive bias benefitting risk classes with the longest expected longevity. However, knowledge on mortality risk unfolds over the life‐course, and it is optimal for risk averse households to annuitize all old‐age consumption already as young buying pooled contracts, even if fair annuities are available later in life or risk class is private information. Borrowing constraints impair such frontloading but are lessened by a mandated pooled annuity targeting the middle‐aged, improving welfare for all risk classes and the first‐best allocation may be implementable.