Pandemic shocks and macroprudential policy
通过扩展DSGE模型，研究大流行冲击下贷款价值比（LTV）规则和利率补贴对福利的影响，发现提高LTV比率可增加社会福利，但最优逆周期LTV规则使储蓄者受益而借款人受损。
Abstract We introduce an extended borrower–saver DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) model, where classifications of occupations are split further into two subcategories, according to whether their occupation is directly “affected” by a pandemic shock. We find that, contrary to the standard literature, during a pandemic shock an increase in the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio can increase social welfare and make all four agent types (borrowers affected, borrowers non-affected, savers affected, and savers non-affected) better off. Countercyclical optimal LTV rules are shown to increase social welfare, with savers gaining at the expense of borrowers, including those mostly affected by the pandemic. An interest rate mortgage subsidy to those worst affected (“affected” mortgage borrowers), in coordination with stricter monetary and LTV policy, are shown to increase both social welfare and the welfare of borrowers and savers affected by the pandemic.