A (Bounded) Preference for Rule Breakers
利用冰球联赛数据发现，教练更偏爱轻微违规的球员，认为他们更投入团队胜利，但极端违规会逆转这种偏好，揭示了组织中违规行为泛滥的一个意外原因。
This paper explores whether, under what conditions, and why supervisors treat rule breakers favorably. Using field data from six seasons in the National Hockey League, we find that coaches select rule breakers for play more often than rule-abiding players, even if rule breaking may ultimately hurt a team’s chance of winning. However, this preference is bounded in several ways. It reverses when a player’s rule breaking becomes extreme, holds for minor (but not major) rule breaking, is absent for both players and teams in the lowest quintile of rule breaking, is observed in regular season (but not playoff) games, and is amplified when teams are on losing streaks but disappears after repeated wins. An experiment replicates this bounded preference for rule breakers and identifies that those in a position to reward rule breakers do so in part because they perceive them as more committed to team success. However, at extreme levels of rule breaking, concerns about the liability rule breakers represent eclipse these positive perceptions, reversing the preferential treatment they enjoyed when their rule breaking was more moderate. Together, these findings illuminate one unexpected reason why rule breaking is so rampant and unethical behavior remains so pernicious in organizations.