Mandatory audit partner rotation and earnings informativeness in the bond market
研究发现强制轮换审计合伙人后，企业盈余反应系数在轮换后几年更积极，尤其当企业发布坏消息、债券期限长、新合伙人行业专长更强、审计所非六大或客户规模小时，而自愿轮换无此效应。
Abstract This study finds that mandatory rotation of engagement partners results in more positive earnings response coefficient (ERC) in the years immediately following rotation than in the years that are not. Further analysis reveals that the positive association is driven by firms that announce bad earnings news and for bonds with longer maturity terms. Furthermore, such positive association is stronger when the incoming engagement partner has more industry expertise than the leaving partner, when the audit firm is a non–Big 6 auditor, and when the client firm is small. Finally, the relationship does not exist for voluntary partner rotation.