The impact of monitoring on politicians’ attendance: Evidence from the Swiss Upper House
利用瑞士上议院2014年引入电子投票系统的改革，发现监督技术提升使议员缺席率下降14%，尤其对寻求连任者效果更显著。
In 2014, the Swiss Upper House switched from voting by show of hands to an electronic voting system, where individual decisions on specific exogenously defined vote types are published automatically. We leverage this update in monitoring technology for select votes to identify the impact of monitoring on politicians’ attendance within a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences methodology. Relying on video recordings of all sessions of the 49th Upper House legislature (2011–2015), we determine pre- and post-reform attendance rates during all votes and compare the change in attendance between votes affected and unaffected by the reform. Monitoring has a positive and significant effect on attendance particularly among legislators running for reelection, as compared to those retiring at the end of the term. • Attendance in the Swiss Upper House increased due to a reform enhancing monitoring. • Enhanced monitoring led to a 14% reduction in absences during public votes. • Vote structure and electoral pressures influence attendance. • Monitoring improved attendance, especially for legislators seeking reelection. • Attendance rose more in voting blocs than in independent votes.