The role of political institutions in the Eurozone's economic convergence process
研究了2002-2019年欧元区人均收入趋同与政治制度的关系，发现政治制度（如监管质量、民主、政府效能、腐败控制）改善有助于收入趋同，对政策制定者有参考价值。
Abstract This paper investigates the nexus between per capita income convergence and political institutions within the Eurozone. Employing data spanning the years 2002–2019, the research initially identifies multiple convergence clusters and subsequently examines the relationship between the creation of these clusters and different aspects of political institutions. The findings reveal that there are multiple steady states in the Eurozone, and their formation is notably influenced by political institutions alongside other conventional economic determinants derived from the Solow model. Furthermore, the study underscores that improvements in regulatory quality, as well as in aspects such as democracy, government effectiveness, and corruption control, positively impact income convergence across all member countries. These findings carry significant policy implications.