The value of say on pay
研究了14个经济体强制股东对高管薪酬投票（薪酬话语权）对投票权市场价值的影响，发现严格约束性改革提升投票价值，而宽松咨询性法律则降低投票价值。
We measure the impact of “say on pay” (SoP) – mandatory shareholder votes on top-management compensation – on the market value of voting rights. By exploiting the staggered introduction of SoP across 14 economies, we show that SoP does not automatically increase the value of shareholder voting rights. While stricter, binding SoP reforms increase voting values, looser advisory SoP laws decrease them. Firms that do not pay their CEOs excessively experience the largest decreases in voting values. Voting values also reflect a country’s level of investor protection, past dissent in SoP ballots, and dynamically adjust to changes in managerial compensation.