Paving the road to re-election
研究印度农村道路建设计划对选举问责机制的影响，发现选民会奖励推动该计划的政党，且这种支持持续两个选举周期，并产生溢出效应。
The prevailing view in the economic literature is that voters are particularly myopic, encouraging governments to leverage short-term re-election strategies. Under such conditions, public capital investment with long-term rewards – despite its central role in the process of sustained economic development – may be neglected. In the context of India’s rural road construction programme, this study evaluates the role which large-scale public infrastructure initiatives have on the electoral accountability mechanism. Using a f u z z y regression discontinuity design with newly-digitised village-level voting outcomes from the 2014 general election, the results provide evidence of electoral support attributed to the political alliance which spearheaded the programme. This support is sustained over two electoral cycles, with significant spillover effects in villages within 2 km of a newly built road. • New roads result in better transport services linking villages to the wider economy. • Villagers reward the party which spearheaded the road expansion programme. • Political rewards are sustained over two election cycles. • There are significant spill-over effects in villages within 2 km of a newly build road.